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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on November 16, 2016, at 1:30 p.m. or as soon thereafter 
as the matter may be heard in Department 61 of the Sacramento County Superior Court, 651 
I Street, Sacramento, California 95814, defendants Carl Ferrer, Michael Lacey and James Larkin, 
respectively the CEO and former owners of an online publisher, Backpage.com, LLC, pursuant to 
California Penal Code §§ 1002-1005, will and hereby do demur to the criminal Complaint filed by 
California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris and all charges asserted on the following grounds: 
1. The Demurrer should be sustained under Penal Code §§ 1004(4) and (5) because 
the Complaint and the prosecution are legally barred under the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, as the Attorney General seeks to hold an online publisher of third-party speech 
criminally liable, with no allegation of scienter that Backpage.com knew the specific speech upon 
which the charges are based was unlawful, much less that the named Defendants had any 
knowledge of or participated in any way in the creation or posting of the speech.  The First 
Amendment bars the prosecution because imposing an obligation on publishers to review all 
speech to ensure that none is unlawful would severely chill free expression. 
2. The Demurrer should be sustained under Penal Code §§ 1004(4) and (5) because 
the Complaint and prosecution are legally barred by Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, which grants immunity to interactive computer services such as 
Backpage.com for any liability based on publishing third-party content or for failing to remove 
any such content, regardless of any allegations that the website knew or should have known of 
illegal content.  Section 230 expressly preempts all state criminal laws and absolutely precludes 
the prosecution in this case.  Indeed, the Attorney General has admitted she has no authority to 
bring state criminal charges against Backpage.com for publishing third-party content. 
3. The Demurrer should be sustained under Penal Code §§ 1004(2) and (4) because 
the Complaint does not state facts that constitute public offenses under the criminal statutes 
charged.  Contrary to Penal Code § 950, the Complaint (and the supporting declaration it 
incorporates) fails to allege facts supporting each element of the charged offenses.   
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a. With regard to the charges of pimping under Cal. Penal Code § 266h, the 
Complaint alleges no facts that Mr. Ferrer knew anything about the nine individuals who 
posted ads that are the premise for the charges, much less that they were prostitutes, as 
required by section 266h.  See Wooten v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. App. 4th 422, 437-38 
(2001) (directing dismissal of claims based on failure to show defendants had any 
knowledge of alleged prostitution, and holding that allegations of generalized knowledge 
are insufficient under Section 266h).  Moreover, the First Amendment requires that, as 
essential elements of the charges against Mr. Ferrer, the State must allege facts (and 
ultimately prove) that he knew of the unlawful nature and content of the specific ads that 
are the subject of the charges, and, for Counts Two-Six, knew that the individuals involved 
were minors.  Yet, the Complaint and declaration allege no such facts, and do not even 
allege that Mr. Ferrer ever saw the subject ads or knew anything about them or the 
individuals who posted the ads. 
b. With regard to the charges of conspiracy under Penal Code § 182, the 
Complaint fails to allege any facts to establish the elements of the crime charged.  The 
Complaint and supporting declaration do not anywhere allege that Messrs. Lacey, Larkin 
and Ferrer entered into any agreement with anyone, or that they had any specific intent to 
commit a public offense of pimping as to any individual or engaged in any overt acts even 
remotely showing a purpose of accomplishing the illegal objective of any such 
(nonexistent) agreement.   
The demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend, because the charges contained 
in the Complaint and the Attorney General’s prosecution are absolutely barred by the First 
Amendment and Section 230 of the CDA and cannot be cured by amendment, and the Complaint 
does not and cannot state facts that constitute public offenses under the criminal statutes charged. 
This Demurrer is supported by the concurrently filed Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities, Request for Judicial Notice (with accompanying Declaration of James C. Grant), and 
the papers and pleadings on file in this matter.   
1 DATED: October 19, 2016. Respectfully submitted, 
2 
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Attorney General arrested and incarcerated the CEO of Backpage.com, LLC 
(“Backpage.com”), charging him with “pimping” under Penal Code § 266h, as well as two former 
owners of the company (Michael Lacey and James Larkin) on charges of conspiring to commit 
pimping, Penal Code § 182.  The basis for the AG’s charges is that third-party users posted ads on 
Backpage.com, and the AG’s office determined by responding to the ads that the users were 
offering prostitution.  With no allegations that Backpage.com had any knowledge of this—much 
less that any of the individual Defendants had knowledge or participated in any way in the ads that 
were created and posted by users—the Complaint alleges that Defendants are guilty of pimping 
and conspiracy because the users paid to post their ads.   
The AG’s Complaint and theory of prosecution are frankly outrageous.  The AG seeks to 
impose criminal liability on a website simply because it published and received fees for third-party 
ads.  The AG’s chrages directly contravene the First Amendment and the immunity afforded to 
websites under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230.  
Escort ads on Backpage.com are protected speech under the First Amendment, as several courts 
have held.  The AG cannot arrest, imprison and refuse to release individuals associated with the 
website simply based on an investigator’s opinions about what he believes is “obvious” about 
escort ads.  Courts upholding the First Amendment rights of Backpage.com and its users have 
rejected the same tack time and again.  The First Amendment also expressly precludes state 
authorities from imposing criminal liability on parties that publish or distribute speech absent 
proof of scienter, i.e., that the publisher knew the specific information published was unlawful.  
The Supreme Court so held over fifty years ago, Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), 
recognizing the First Amendment prohibits states from imposing criminal liability that would 
require publishers to review all materials they distribute, because such a requirement would 
severely chill speech.   
More specifically, the AG’s theory expressly violates Section 230, which Congress enacted 
twenty years ago to preserve and promote free speech on the Internet by immunizing website 
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operators from liability for publishing content provided by third-party users.  Section 230 
preempts all contrary state laws—including state criminal laws.  Indeed, Attorney General Harris 
has acknowledged that Section 230 precludes her from prosecuting Backpage.com, but she has 
now commenced a prosecution to do precisely what she admits Section 230 prohibits.   
The AG’s Complaint should be dismissed immediately.  The charges the state asserts 
amount to a brazen effort to intimidate or shut down an online publisher by using all the criminal 
sanctions at the AG’s disposal, despite that she has no authority whatsoever to do so.   
II. BACKGROUND 
On September 26, 2016, the Attorney General’s office filed the Complaint, charging 
Mr. Ferrer with nine counts of pimping and attempted pimping under Cal. Penal Code § 266h, and 
charging him and Messrs. Lacey and Larkin with one count of conspiracy based on the same 
alleged pimping charges.1  In support of arrest warrants, the AG submitted a declaration of Special 
Agent Brian Fichtner of the California Department of Justice (“Fitchner Decl.”).2  The Complaint 
also expressly incorporates the supporting declaration.  Complaint at 9.   
The AG coordinated with Texas authorities to arrest Mr. Ferrer at the Houston airport on 
October 6, 2016, transferring him to California and holding him in custody.  Messrs. Lacey and 
Larkin voluntarily traveled to and appeared in Sacramento, California on October 10, and were 
arrested and incarcerated that day.  In the meantime, on October 6-7, Texas authorities executed 
search warrants for Backpage.com’s offices in Dallas and Mr. Ferrer’s home.   
                                                 
1 More specifically, the Complaint alleges against Mr. Ferrer four counts of pimping under Penal 
Code § 266h(b)(2) (Counts Two-Four and Six), one count of attempting pimping under Sections 
266h(b)(2) and 664 (Count Five), and four counts of pimping under Section 266h(a) (Counts 
Seven-Ten).  The Complaint also charges Mr. Ferrer in the single conspiracy count under Penal 
Code § 182 (Count One), along with Messrs. Lacey and Larkin. 
2 Materials supporting this motion are provided with the accompanying Motion for Judicial Notice 
with Declaration of James C. Grant (“MJN”).  For the Court’s convenience, the Complaint, the 
Fitchner Declaration and the Texas search warrant for Backpage.com offices are attached to this 
Demurrer as Exhibits A, B and C, respectively. 
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A. Backpage.com. 
Backpage.com operates an online classified advertising service through which users can 
post ads in a variety of categories, including local places, buy/sell/trade, automotive, rentals, real 
estate, jobs, dating, adult, and services.  See Fitchner Decl. at 2-3; Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 
939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 813 (M.D. Tenn. 2013).  The site is organized geographically, by state and 
municipality.  Id.  Users post millions of ads every month, making Backpage.com the second-
largest online classified ad service in the country, after Craigslist.  See Fitchner Decl. at 2 
(“BACKPAGE is similar to Craigslist.org”); Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 
1262, 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2012).  
Users provide all the content for ads they post on the website, using an automated 
interface; Backpage.com does not dictate or require any content.  Until July 2015, the website 
charged for ads in the adult and dating categories, while users could post ads for free in other 
categories.  See Fitchner Decl. at 12; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 813, 815 (noting the charges 
helped to discourage improper posting and state AGs originally encouraged Craigslist to impose 
charges to aid law enforcement).   
Backpage.com imposes rules for ads posted on the site, and all users must affirmatively 
accept the posting rules.  Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 813-14.  The rules are designed to prevent 
improper ads or misuse of the website.  The site’s Terms of Use also prohibit illegal acts and warn 
that improper posts will be reported to law enforcement and subject to criminal prosecution.  See 
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1266.  The site contains numerous hyperlinks to a “User Safety” 
page, which includes phone numbers and links for the National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children (“NCMEC”) and similar resources.  Id.  Every ad contains a “Report Ad” button, and 
Backpage.com has an email address (abuse@backpage.com) for users to identify ads they believe 
improper or suspect.  See Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 814.   
“In addition to user reports, Backpage.com monitors potentially inappropriate ads through 
automated and manual reviews.”  Id.  Through this screening, Backpage.com blocks and removes 
posts and refers any that may indicate child exploitation to NCMEC.  See McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 
2d at 1266-67.  In his declaration, Agent Fichtner confirms that Backpage.com’s practices are 
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effective.  When he sought to post an escort ad “containing sexual verbiage indicative of a 
prostitution ad,” Backpage.com blocked the ad.  Fitchner Decl. at 6-7.  On another occasion, 
Agent Fichtner attempted to repost an ad that had been removed, “but Backpage.com did not allow 
it to go through.”  Id. at 6. 
“Backpage.com also regularly works with local, state and federal law enforcement officials 
by responding to subpoena requests, providing officials with Internet search tools, and removing 
posts and blocking users at the request of officials.”  Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 814.  Here again, 
Agent Fichtner attests to Backpage.com’s cooperation with law enforcement.  After he posted 
“undercover ads” on the website, he contacted Mr. Ferrer, identified himself as law enforcement, 
said that he “had identified a prostitution ad,” and asked that it be removed.  Backpage.com 
removed the ad that day (as well as another ad Agent Fichtner had posted), and would not allow it 
to be re-posted.  Fichtner Decl. at 6. 
B. Unsuccessful Efforts of AG Harris and Other AGs to Shut Down Adult Online 
Advertising and Admissions that CDA Section 230 Bars State Prosecutions. 
In 2010, Craigslist shut down its adult services category in response to pressure from a 
group of state attorneys general.3  Less than a week later, the AGs targeted Backpage.com, 
demanding it shut down its adult category.4  Attorney General Harris joined and signed an 
August 31, 2011 letter from the National Association of Attorneys General (“NAAG”) to 
Backpage.com (which was publicly released and promoted by NAAG) demanding that it remove 
its adult category as Craigslist had done.5  Yet, NAAG’s president at the time admitted the state 
AGs “have little legal standing to forcibly shut down” Backpage.com, because Section 230 
                                                 
3 See M. Lindenberger, Craigslist Comes Clean: No More ‘Adult Services,’ Ever, TIME, Sept. 16, 
2010, http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2019499,00.html. 
4 See State Attorney General Letter, http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/ 
pressroom/2010_09/Backpage_com9-20-2010.pdf). 
5 See MJN Ex. D (NAAG August 31, 2011 letter to Backpage.com counsel, http://www.ct.gov/ag/ 
lib/ag/press_releases/2011/083111backpageletter.pdf). 
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provides “broad immunity” to websites for third-party content, presenting a “high barrier” 
precluding any action by the state AGs.6 
In July 2013, AG Harris signed on to another NAAG letter addressed to various members 
of Congress, urging that Section 230 be amended to exempt state criminal laws from immunity so 
that state authorities could pursue Backpage.com.  The letter acknowledged that “[f]ederal courts 
have broadly interpreted the immunity provided by the CDA,” to “prevent[] State and local law 
enforcement agencies from prosecuting” Backpage.com and insisted that “[t]his must change.”7   
The efforts of NAAG and Attorney General Harris to amend Section 230 to allow state 
prosecutions of websites have been unsuccessful, as have their other efforts to censor 
Backpage.com.  As discussed below, see Section III.B, three states (Washington, Tennessee and 
New Jersey) passed criminal laws aimed at Backpage.com, but courts promptly enjoined and 
struck down all three laws as unconstitutional and preempted by Section 230.  See McKenna, 881 
F. Supp. 2d 1262; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805; Backpage.com, LLC v. Hoffman, 2013 WL 
4502097 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013).  And, rather than lessen the CDA’s strong immunity to websites, 
Congress has “ratcheted it up … by expanding the scope of Section 230 immunity to preempt the 
enforcement of inconsistent foreign judgments.”  Doe ex rel. Roe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 104 F. 
Supp. 3d 149, 156 (D. Mass. 2015) (dismissing under Section 230 private claims alleging 
Backpage.com violated federal sex trafficking laws), aff’d sub nom. Jane Doe No. 1 v. 
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. petition filed, No. 16-276 (U.S. Aug. 31, 
2016). 
                                                 
6 See MJN Ex. E (Washington AG gubernatorial campaign website quoting press statements about 
AG’s efforts against Backpage.com and the bar presented by Section 230).   
7 See MJN Ex. F (NAAG July 23, 2013 letter to members of Congress, https://www.eff.org/files/ 
cda-ag-letter.pdf).  This letter was promoted by a group within NAAG called the “Backpage 
Executive Committee,” which explained that the purpose of the proposed Section 230 amendment 
was to “extend[] criminal jurisdiction … to state and local governments,” because under the law 
only the federal government has authority to prosecute websites.  See id. Ex. G (June 14, 2013 
letter from the Backpage Executive Committee to all Attorneys General, Chief Deputies, and 
Executive Assistants, https://www.cdt.org/files/file/AG-Letter-Section-230.pdf). 
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C. The Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant Declaration. 
The AG asserts eight charges of pimping and one charge of attempted pimping against 
Mr. Ferrer based on allegations that nine individuals posted and paid for ads on Backpage.com.  
Complaint at 4-9 (Counts Two-Ten).8  The Complaint and declaration provide no basis for these 
charges except that Mr. Ferrer is the CEO of Backpage.com and the named partner of the 
corporate parent of Backpage.com, LLC.  Fichtner Decl. at 3.  Agent Fichtner’s declaration 
explains that all of the ads about these individuals were written and posted by the individuals 
themselves.  Id. at 7-11.  The AG does not allege that Mr.Ferrer had any role in or any knowledge 
of the ads or that he ever even saw them.  Indeed, Agent Fichtner alleges the individuals who 
posted ads evaded the website’s rules and restrictions, so that Backpage.com could not have 
known the ads were improper or concerned prostitution.  Id. at 8, 10 (including statement by one 
individual:  “how are they supposed to know I’m underage?”).  The only specific allegations 
Agent Fitchner offers concerning Mr. Ferrer relating to ads on the website are that he promptly 
removed ads when requested and he was copied on Backpage.com’s responses to “numerous law 
enforcement subpoenas and search warrants.”  Fitchner Decl. at 4, 6. 
Instead, the Complaint charges that Mr. Ferrer is guilty of pimping because the individuals 
paid for their ads (in amounts totaling $79.60, see Complaint at 3-4), Backpage.com received these 
payments, and therefore Mr. Ferrer “did live and derive support and maintenance” from persons 
engaged in prostitution or “solicit[ed] and receive[d] compensation for soliciting for said 
prostitute[s].”  Complaint at 5 (see Penal Code § 266h). 
The one-count conspiracy charge alleged against Messrs. Ferrer, Lacey and Larkin is even 
more attenuated.  These gentlemen were, respectively, the chief editor and publisher of Village 
Voice Media Holdings, the company that formerly owned Backpage.com as well as fourteen 
weekly newspapers across the country.  As Agent Fichtner asserts, they no longer own interests in 
Backpage.com and haven’t for almost two years.  Fichtner Decl. at 3.  Nonetheless, the AG 
charges them with conspiracy to commit pimping as to the nine individuals who advertised on the 
                                                 
8 The nine individuals are identified as:  A.C., E.V., L.F., E.S., Z.G., A.H, S.C., L.B., and K.A. 
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website (the ads that are the predicate for the claims against Mr. Ferrer) based solely on their 
former ownership interests in Backpage.com and that the website charged for escort ads, 
employed a process to screen ads, arranged for a processor to handle credit card transactions; and 
the nine individuals paid for the ads.  Complaint at 2-4.  As with Mr. Ferrer, the Complaint and 
declaration offer no allegations that Messrs. Lacey and Larkin ever had anything to do with or 
knew anything about these ads.   
D. The AG’s Arrests and Incarceration of Defendants, Searches and Seizures, 
and Opposition to Defendants’ Efforts to Post Bail. 
The Attorney General’s office did not contact Backpage.com, its counsel, or the 
Defendants before moving forward with arrests and searches based on the Complaint 
(notwithstanding that Backpage.com has cooperated with the AG’s office many times before).  
Rather, the AG enlisted Texas law enforcement authorities to arrest Mr. Ferrer on October 6, 
2016, as he deplaned in Houston from a flight from Amsterdam, based on the California AG’s 
Complaint and arrest warrant.  The Texas authorities jailed Mr. Ferrer, while the California AG’s 
office sought to extradite him.  Through counsel, Mr. Ferrer agreed to be transferred to California, 
and he was flown to Sacramento and incarcerated there on October 7.   
On October 6 and 7, 2016, Texas authorities executed search warrants based on the 
declaration supplied by the California AG.  In a two-day search of Backpage.com’s offices in 
Dallas, authorities seized computers, servers, passwords, and scores of boxes of documents, 
effectively anything relating to Backpage.com’s operation of its business and the website.9  Texas 
law enforcement also searched Mr. Ferrer’s home.   
In the meantime, the AG obtained an order requiring bail of $500,000 to secure 
Mr. Ferrer’s release.  Counsel for Mr. Ferrer sought to make arrangements to post bail, but the 
AG’s office insisted it would object to any payment of the bail or posting of a bond under Cal. 
Penal Code § 1275.1, and would demand proof that funds were not “tainted” as being connected in 
some way to revenues from Backpage.com (notwithstanding that AG lacked authority to prosecute 
and the Complaint did not and could not allege that all funds associated with Backpage.com were 
                                                 
9 See Texas search warrant for Backpage.com offices, attached as Exhibit C. 
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unlawful).  Mr. Ferrer’s counsel communicated to the AG’s office that bond could be posted based 
on funds unrelated to Backpage.com (and offered to provide proof), but the AG still insisted that 
Mr. Ferrer remain incarcerated until a hearing could be held on its demands under Penal Code 
§ 1275.1.   
Messrs. Lacey and Larkin agreed to voluntarily travel to and appear to state authorities in 
Sacramento on October 10, 2016.  They expected and were prepared to post bail (set at $250,000 
for each), but, again, the AG insisted that it would contest any bond or bail under Section 1275.1.  
As a consequence, these gentlemen were also taken into custody.   
While defendants’ counsel sought to resolve the bail issues as soon as possible, the AG 
asked for a delay until after the defendants appeared for a public arraignment, which they did on 
October 12, 2016.  The next day, the Court held the 1275.1 hearing and promptly ordered that the 
defendants be released on bail.  Mr. Ferrer was finally released in the early hours of October 14, 
after he had been held in custody for a week, and Messrs. Lacey and Larkin were released after 
being incarcerated for four days. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standards for a Demurrer Under Penal Code § 1004. 
Penal Code § 1004 authorizes a defendant to demur to an accusatory pleading that (1) fails 
to “substantially conform” to the provisions of Sections 950 and 952, which govern the form and 
content of accusatory pleadings, (2) alleges facts that “do not constitute a public offense,” or 
(3) “contains matter which, if true, would constitute a legal justification or excuse of the offense 
charged, or other legal bar to the prosecution.”  Id. §§ 1004(2), (4), (5).  A demurrer “tests only 
those defects appearing on the face of [the accusatory] pleading,” and is appropriate when it 
“raises an issue of law as to the sufficiency of the … pleading.”  People v. Osorio, 235 Cal. App. 
4th 1408, 1412 (2015) (quoting People v. Manfredi, 169 Cal. App. 4th 622, 626 (2008)).  “[F]or 
purposes of demurrer … matters which may be judicially noticed may be said to appear 
constructively on the face of the pleading.”  People v. Tolbert, 176 Cal. App. 3d 685, 689 (1986).   
A demurrer is appropriate to dismiss charges that are unconstitutional or preempted.  See 
Williams v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1, 6 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2003) (“A 
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demurrer’s purpose under section 1004 is dismissal of a pleading which lacks adequate notice of 
the public offense charged or charges one that is unconstitutional so as to generate a legally 
sufficient accusation.”), disagreed with on other grounds, Osman v. Appellate Div. of Superior 
Court, 134 Cal. App. 4th 32 (2005).  Indeed, the California Supreme Court has often sustained 
demurrers dismissing criminal charges that violate the First Amendment.  See, e.g., People v. 
Superior Court, 49 Cal. 3d 14, 27 (1989) (sustaining superior court demurrer to charges against 
theatre for unlawfully displaying adult films based on standard that violated the First 
Amendment); Dulaney v. Municipal Court, 11 Cal. 3d 77, 89 (1974) (sustaining demurrer and 
entering writ of prohibition prohibiting prosecution under municipal ordinance precluding posting 
of signs on utility poles as violating the First Amendment); Whitney v. Municipal Court, 58 Cal. 
2d 907, 910-11 (1962) (sustaining demurrer to prosecution under municipal obscenity ordinance 
preempted by state law); see also Mandel v. Municipal Court, 276 Cal. App. 2d 649, 673-74 
(1969) (reversing trial court decision refusing to grant demurrer and holding that prosecution of 
defendant under vagrancy ordinance for distributing anti-draft leaflets on high school campuses 
violated First Amendment).  As the case law demonstrates, when the State seeks to prosecute 
criminal charges that violate the Constitution or as to which the State has no authority, a Section 
1004 demurrer is the proper remedy to dismiss the charges and stop the prosecution at the outset. 
B. The Complaint and Prosecution Are Legally Barred By the First Amendment. 
The Attorney General’s theory of prosecution violates basic principles of First Amendment 
law.  The AG’s theory, reflected in the Complaint and supporting declaration, is that the State may 
prosecute individuals associated with an online publisher simply for publishing third-party speech 
if it turns out that some content implicates unlawful conduct, i.e. prostitution.  Ample Supreme 
Court precedent expressly rejects such a theory of unknowing criminal liability, given the chilling 
effect it would have on free speech.   
The AG initiated this prosecution in the face of an unbroken line of cases holding that 
online forums for classified ads—and specifically Backpage.com—are protected by the First 
Amendment.  Government officials at various levels have attempted to censor such advertising 
forums in many ways, and each has been held to violate the Constitution.  Speech through the 
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
 
 10 
DEMURRER TO CRIMINAL COMPLAINT, Case No. 16FE019224 
D
A
V
IS
 W
R
IG
H
T 
TR
EM
A
IN
E 
LL
P 
Internet is subject to the same First Amendment protections and judicial scrutiny as applied to 
other media.  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).  And, the First Amendment concerns in 
this case are particularly acute, where the state has commenced a criminal prosecution.  Ashcroft v. 
ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004) (speech restrictions “enforced by severe criminal penalties, have 
the constant potential to be a repressive force in the lives and thoughts of a free people”). 
In a series of cases, federal courts enjoined state criminal laws that targeted Backpage.com, 
holding that escort ads on the website are protected speech and states’ efforts to criminalize 
publication violated the First Amendment.  First, in Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. 
Supp. 2d 1262, the court enjoined enforcement of  a Washington state statute that made it a felony 
to publish, disseminate or display content that contained a “depiction of a minor” and any “explicit 
or implicit offer” of sex for “something of value.”  881 F. Supp. 2d at 1268.  The court rejected the 
state’s argument that the law affected only speech proposing illegal transactions, noting that escort 
ads have long been permitted and escort services are licensed and regulated in many states.  Id. at 
1282;10 see also id. at 1280 (“The statue criminalizes more than offers to engage in illegal 
transactions because the statute encompasses transactions that are not illegal.”).  The court went on 
to note that the Washington law was problematic not only because of “the protected speech that it 
regulates by its terms,” but also because it would “chill a substantial amount of protected speech,” 
by creating a Hobson’s choice for websites of either shutting down escort advertising or requiring 
age verification and risking prosecution.  Id. at 1282.   
The court in Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, struck down a similar 
Tennessee statute, likewise holding that third-party ads on Backpage.com are protected speech 
under the First Amendment.11  Here again, the court rejected the state’s argument that the statute 
“[did] not implicate First Amendment scrutiny because it criminalize[d] only offers to engage in 
                                                 
10 The same is true in California, as many cities and counties in the state license and regulate 
escort services.  See, e.g., Sacramento City Code ch. 5.04; San Francisco Police Code, art. 15.6; 
Los Angeles County Code ch. 7.38; Orange County Code, tit. 5, art. 22 
11 The Tennessee law made it a felony to sell or offer to sell “an advertisement that would appear 
to a reasonable person to be for the purpose of engaging in what would be a commercial sex act.”  
Cooper, 939 F.3d at 816. 
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illegal transactions,” noting that the “statute’s potential reach extend[ed] to notices related to legal, 
consensual activity by adults.”  Id. at 833-34.  As the court aptly said in that case: 
The Constitution tells us that—when freedom of speech hangs in the balance—the 
state may not use a butcher knife on a problem that requires a scalpel to fix.  Nor 
may a state enforce a law that flatly conflicts with federal law. 
Id. at 813.   
In the third case of the trilogy concerning state criminal laws aimed at Backpage.com, 
Backpage.com, LLC v. Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, the court struck down a New Jersey statute 
almost identical to the Washington law that had been invalidated, again rejecting arguments of the 
state that escort ads on the website are unprotected speech.  Id. at *9-11 (accepting argument that 
the law would impermissibly burden any Internet “forum for communication … if it does not 
police or eliminate user postings”). 
In each of these cases, state authorities falsely sought to cast all escort ads as ads for 
prostitution, and each time courts rejected the arguments because the states’ theories and laws 
would have burdened broad swaths of constitutionally protected speech.  See McKenna, 881 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1280, 1282; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 831; Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *9-11.12  
More recently, the Seventh Circuit underscored this point when it enjoined efforts by the Sheriff 
of Cook County to bully credit card companies into terminating services to Backpage.com based 
on the same false premise.  In Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 235-36 (7th Cir. 2015), 
cert. denied, 2016 WL 1723950 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2016), the Seventh Circuit held that Sheriff Dart’s 
threatening letters and other actions toward Visa and MasterCard constituted an unconstitutional 
prior restraint under Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).  Here too, the Sheriff 
argued that all ads in the adult section of Backpage.com were unlawful, but the Seventh Circuit 
rejected the argument and held that First Amendment protections applied.  807 F.3d at 234 (“Nor 
                                                 
12 The courts in the three cases discussed above barred enforcement of the respective state laws 
because they forced Backpage.com to choose between “foregoing the right to publish third-party 
content and risking felony charges.”  Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 845.  Here, there is not just a risk 
but the reality of criminal charges, coupled with incarceration of the individual defendants and 
dragnet searches and seizures of the publisher’s home and business offices.  The constitutional 
stakes here exceed the possible chilling effect that persuaded courts to invalidate state laws in 
McKenna, Cooper, and Hoffman. 
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is Sheriff Dart on solid ground in suggesting that everything in the adult section of Backpage’s 
website is criminal, violent, or exploitive.... [N]ot all advertisements for sex are advertisements for 
illegal sex.”).  As Judge Posner wrote, “a public official who tries to shut down an avenue of 
expression of ideas and opinions through actual or threatened imposition of government power or 
sanction is violating the First Amendment.”  Id. at 230 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
The Attorney General’s Complaint and theory of prosecution is likewise based on the 
flawed (and oft-rejected) premise that the State can assert criminal charges based merely on 
allegations that escort ads are illegal or may concern unlawful conduct.  The First Amendment 
does not permit such a blunderbuss approach.  Under the First Amendment, in all contexts, it is the 
government’s burden to establish and justify actions that burden speech rights.  United States v. 
Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000) (“When the Government restricts speech, [it] 
bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.”).  In short, the state may not 
merely presume that speech is unlawful. 
The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress 
unlawful speech.  Protected speech does not become unprotected merely because 
it resembles the latter.  The Constitution requires the reverse.  “[T]he possible 
harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is 
outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others will be muted ….” 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 612 (1973)).   
Thus, it is a basic proposition of First Amendment law that states cannot criminally punish 
publishers or distributors of speech without proof of scienter, i.e., sufficient proof that a defendant 
knew that the specific speech that is the basis for criminal charges was unlawful.  In Smith v. 
California, 361 U.S. 147, the Supreme Court struck down a Los Angeles ordinance imposing 
criminal sanctions on the sale of obscene books which required no scienter, because absent proof 
that a seller had knowledge, “he will tend to restrict the books he sells” and the law would 
“impose a severe limitation on the public’s access to constitutionally protected matter” because the 
threat of unknowing criminal liability would cause self-censorship, and “the bookseller’s burden 
would become the public’s burden.”  Id. at 153-54.  See also Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 
511 (1966) (“[t]he Constitution requires proof of scienter to avoid the hazard of self-censorship of 
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
 
 13 
DEMURRER TO CRIMINAL COMPLAINT, Case No. 16FE019224 
D
A
V
IS
 W
R
IG
H
T 
TR
EM
A
IN
E 
LL
P 
constitutionally protected material and to compensate for the ambiguities inherent in the definition 
of obscenity”).  Similarly, in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994), the 
Court interpreted a federal statute prohibiting interstate transfer of child pornography to require 
that the government prove a defendant had knowledge of “both … the sexually explicit nature of 
the material and … the age of the performers,” because a lack of such scienter requirements 
“would raise serious constitutional doubts.”  Id. at 78.13  California cases recognize and follow 
these constitutional principles, holding that statutes criminalizing the distribution of obscene or 
unlawful materials must contain scienter requirements (or be fairly interpreted as doing so) 
because otherwise such laws “would have an unacceptable chilling effect on the public’s access to 
constitutionally protected materials.”  Berry v. City of Santa Barbara, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1075, 1087 
(1995).   
The AG’s Complaint in this case ignores and is irreparably deficient under these First 
Amendment principles.  Nothing in the Complaint or Agent Ficthner’s declaration alleges that the 
advertisements posted by the nine individuals upon which the charges are based were unlawful on 
their face.  The declaration states that all of the ads were written and posted by the individuals 
themselves.  There is no allegation that the defendants or anyone from Backpage.com had any role 
in creating or posting the ads.  The AG does not even allege that Mr. Ferrer ever saw or had any 
knowledge of the ads.  The Complaint is still more deficient as to Messrs. Lacey and Larkin, as it 
alleges that their only connection is that they formerly owned interests in Backpage.com and so 
should be criminally liable because the website received payments of $79.60 for ads from the nine 
individuals.  The allegations set forth in Agent Fitchner’s declaration do not even attempt to 
establish scienter as to any of the defendants for any of the ads that are the basis for the state’s 
prosecution.  The First Amendment expressly forbids criminal charges on this premise.   
Criminal sanctions inhibiting free speech rights are among the most pernicious forms of 
government violations of the First Amendment.  See Reno, 521 U.S. at 872 (“The severity of 
                                                 
13 See also United States v. United States District Court, 858 F.2d 534, 540 (9th Cir. 1988) (“the 
first amendment does not permit the imposition of criminal sanctions on the basis of strict liability 
where doing so would seriously chill protected speech”); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. 
Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 690 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Statutes that impose criminal responsibility for 
dissemination of unprotected speech must contain a knowledge requirement.”). 
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criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even 
arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images.”); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) 
(even as to criminal charges that are groundless, the threat of prosecution “is a real and substantial 
one” that can have a “chilling effect on protected expression”).  Here, the severity of the charges 
leveled, and the aggressiveness with which the AG has sought to demonize and punish the 
defendants on baseless charges illustrates why this Court should promptly dismiss this 
prosecution.  See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment 
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”). 
C. The Complaint and Prosecution Are Legally Deficient Under Section 230 of 
the CDA, as the Attorney General Has Admitted.   
Free speech on the Internet is protected not only by the First Amendment, but also by 
Section 230 of the CDA.  “[T]he plain language of section 230 ‘creates a federal immunity to any 
cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-
party user.’”  Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 43 (2006) (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 
129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)).  In simple terms, Section 230 bars any state-law claims—civil 
or criminal—against an online publisher such as Backpage.com (and the defendants) based on 
third-party content it publishes.  Attorney General Harris knows and has admitted she has no 
authority to prosecute Backpage.com for ads it publishes, yet the Complaint and the prosecution 
here seek to do exactly that.   
Section 230 states:  “No provider … of an interactive computer service shall be treated as 
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”  
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).14  The statute expressly preempts state laws:  “No cause of action may be 
brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this 
section.”  Id. § 230(e)(3).15 
                                                 
14 An “information content provider” is one “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3), such as users who post on Backpage.com. 
15 California courts routinely reject claims based on Section 230 on preliminary motions.  E.g., 
Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th 33 (2006) (affirming trial court order granting special motion to strike claims 
based on Section 230); Hupp v. Freedom Commc’ns, Inc., 221 Cal. App. 4th 398 (2013) (same); 
Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 561, 563, 566 (2009) (affirming trial court orders 
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Congress enacted Section 230 to achieve two goals.  First, the statute is meant “to 
encourage the unfettered and unregulated development of free speech on the Internet, and to 
promote the development of e-commerce.”  Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003); 
accord Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 56 (Section 230 reflects “legislative commitment to the value of 
maintaining a free market for online expression”); Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 145 Cal. App. 
4th 790, 802-03 (2006) (CDA was intended to “avoid the chilling effect upon Internet free speech” 
that would arise from imposing liability on “companies that do not create potentially harmful 
messages but are simply intermediaries for their delivery”).  Congress recognized the Internet 
would be crippled if online providers could be held liable for third-party content, “given the 
volume of material communicated …, the difficulty of separating lawful from unlawful speech, 
and the relative lack of incentives to protect lawful speech.”  Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. 
Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418-19 (1st Cir. 2007); see Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1034 (absent Section 
230, “speech over the Internet will be chilled rather than encouraged”); see 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4) 
and (b)(2) (finding the Internet has “flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of 
government regulation,” and Section 230 is intended to “preserve the vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet”).   
Second, Congress sought to encourage online providers to self-police for potentially 
harmful or offensive material by providing immunity for such efforts.  See Doe II, 175 Cal. App. 
4th at 570 (emphasizing “Congress’ intent ‘to remove disincentives for the development and 
utilization of blocking and filtering technologies’” (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4)); Batzel, 333 
F.3d at 1028.  Congress recognized that if websites undertook to screen or block improper content 
but could be held liable for doing so imperfectly, they likely would do no screening at all.  See 
Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 44 (noting that, in passing Section 230, Congress expressly rejected Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), which 
applied common law principles to hold Prodigy liable as a publisher because it screened and 
edited some bulletin board messages to prevent offensive content but failed to delete the posts 
                                                                                                                                                                
sustaining demurrers based on Section 230); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816, 819 
(2002) (same). 
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about which the plaintiff claimed); see also Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1029 (“If efforts to review and 
omit third-party defamatory, obscene or inappropriate material make a computer service provider 
or user liable for posted speech, then website operators and Internet service providers are likely to 
abandon efforts to eliminate such material from their site[s].”).   
The purposes and scope of Section 230 immunity were summarized by the Fourth Circuit 
in Zeran, which California courts have followed as “[t]he leading case on immunity protection 
under Section 230,” Doe II, 175 Cal. App. 4th at 569; see Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 42-46; Delfino, 
145 Cal. App. 4th at 802-803: 
Congress’ purpose in providing the § 230 immunity was thus evident.  Interactive 
computer services have millions of users.  The amount of information 
communicated via interactive computer services is therefore staggering.  The 
specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would have an obvious 
chilling effect.  It would be impossible for service providers to screen each of 
their millions of postings for possible problems.  Faced with potential liability for 
each message republished by their services, interactive computer service 
providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages 
posted.  Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and 
chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect. 
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (citations omitted), quoted in Doe II, 175 Cal. App. 4th at 569.16 
Courts have interpreted Section 230 in accordance with its purposes.  Thus, California 
courts have followed the uniform interpretation of the federal circuit courts in holding that Section 
230 establishes broad immunity for online providers.  Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 53 (Section 230 
“broadly shield[s] all providers from liability for ‘publishing’ information received from third 
parties”); Doe II, 175 Cal. App. 4th at 572 (noting “consensus to interpret Section 230 broadly”).17   
                                                 
16 Congress recognized that some material on the Internet could be harmful, but made a policy 
choice that liability could be imposed on “the person who creates or develops unlawful content, 
but not the interactive computer service provider who merely enables that content to be posted 
online.”  Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 2009). 
17 See Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (“circuits have 
interpreted [Section 230] to establish broad federal immunity”); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 
Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting “consensus” that “§ 230(c) provides broad 
immunity for publishing content provided primarily by third parties”); Green v. Am. Online, 318 
F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010); Doe v. 
MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under 
Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008); Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t 
Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 406-07 (6th Cir. 2014); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 
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Likewise, the case law uniformly holds that Section 230 forbids claims against a website 
“for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions” about whether to block or allow 
content.  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.  “[A]ny activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to 
exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune under section 230.”  Fair 
Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 
2008) (en banc); accord Doe II, 175 Cal. App. 4th at 572 (Section 230 protects “exercise of a 
publisher’s traditional editorial functions, such as editing, altering, or deciding whether or not to 
publish certain material”); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124 (“[u]nder section 230(c), … so long as a 
third party willingly provides the essential published content, the interactive service provider 
receives full immunity regardless of the specific editing or selection process”). 
Section 230 immunity applies and protects a website notwithstanding allegations that it 
knew or should have known of unlawful content or conduct, as “[s]ubjecting service providers to 
notice liability would defeat ‘the dual purposes’ of section 230, by encouraging providers to 
restrict speech and abstain from self-regulation.”  Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 45 (quoting Zeran, 129 
F.3d at 333).  “It is, by now, well established that notice of the unlawful nature of the information 
provided is not enough to make it the service provider’s own speech.”  Lycos, 478 F.3d at 420 
(citing Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 51). 
By its terms, Section 230 preempts and precludes not only state civil claims but also 
charges under state criminal laws.  Section 230(c)(1) states, without qualification, that “[n]o cause 
of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is 
inconsistent with this section.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (emphasis added).  While immunity does 
not extend to prosecutions under a “Federal criminal statute,” id. § 230(e)(1) (emphasis added), 
state criminal statutes are not exempt from its reach.  “If Congress had wanted all criminal statutes 
to trump the CDA, it could have written subsection [230(e)](1) to cover ‘any criminal statute’ or 
‘any similar State criminal statute.’  Instead, sub-subsection (1) is limited to federal criminal 
                                                                                                                                                                
1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015); Ben 
Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000); Zeran, 129 F.3d 
at 330-31.  
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statutes.”  Voicenet Commn’cns, Inc. v. Corbett, 2006 WL 2506318, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 
2006) (emphasis added).  Every court to consider this issue has reached the same conclusion, 
holding that Section 230 preempts state criminal laws.  See McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1275 (“If 
Congress did not want the CDA to apply in state criminal actions, it would have said so.”); 
Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 821-26; Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *6; People v. Gourlay, 2009 
WL 529216, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2009) (“the phrase ‘any State or local law’ includes 
civil and criminal laws”).18   
Section 230 provides “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Nemet 
Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 254, and, as a result, courts uniformly hold that claims against online 
providers based on third-party content should be dismissed at the earliest possible opportunity, to 
avoid “costly and protracted legal battles,” Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1175.  Congress’s 
intent to protect Internet free speech and the purpose of the immunity are “effectively lost if a case 
is erroneously permitted to go to trial” rather than being dismissed at the outset.  Nemet Chevrolet, 
591 F.3d at 254; accord Jones, 755 F.3d at 417 (“[g]iven the role that the CDA plays in an open 
and robust internet by preventing the speech-chilling threat of the heckler’s veto, we point out that 
determinations of immunity under the CDA should be resolved at an earlier stage of litigation”). 
In the trilogy of cases striking down state laws aimed at Backpage.com, all three federal 
courts held that the laws were invalid and Backpage.com was entitled to immunity under Section 
230.  In McKenna, the court held the Washington law “impos[ed] liability on Backpage.com … 
for information created by third parties—namely ads for commercial sex acts depicting minors—
so long as it ‘knows’ that it is publishing, disseminating, displaying, or causing to be published, 
disseminated, or displayed such information.”  881 F. Supp. 2d at 1273.  In doing so, the law 
“create[d] an incentive for online service providers not to monitor content … precisely the 
situation that the CDA was enacted to remedy.”  Id.; see also Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 823 
                                                 
18 The legislative history of Section 230 reinforces this conclusion.  As originally written, Section 
230(b)(5) stated “[i]t is the policy of the United States to… ensure vigorous enforcement of 
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of 
computer.”  H.R. 1978 (June 30, 1995).  But it was later changed to say “[i]t is the policy of the 
United States … to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws ….”  47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(b)(5) (emphasis added). 
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(enjoining Tennessee statute because it “impose[d] liability on websites such as Backpage.com for 
selling or offering to sell advertisements, activity inherent in their role as publishers”); Hoffman, 
2013 WL 4502097, at *6 (similar law “r[a]n[] afoul of Section 230 by imposing liability … for 
information created by third parties—namely ads for commercial sex acts depicting minors”). 
The AG’s tack to impose criminal liability on the Defendants for Backpage.com’s 
publication of third-party content is likewise expressly barred and preempted under Section 230.  
Section 230 immunity applies when:  “(1) the defendant [is] a provider or user of an interactive 
computer service; (2) the cause of action treat[s] the defendant as a publisher or speaker of 
information; and (3) the information at issue [is] provided by another information content 
provider.”  Gentry, 99 Cal. App. 4th at 830 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)).  All of the elements of 
the three-part test for Section 230 immunity are established here.   
First, Backpage.com indisputably is a “provider … of an interactive computer service.”  47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162 n.6 (the “most common interactive 
computer services are websites”); Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *6 (Backpage is a “provider[] 
of an interactive computer service within the meaning of CDA Section 230.”).  The defendants are 
also entitled to immunity, as Section 230 extends to individuals who operate websites, as well as 
to the websites themselves.  See, e.g., Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1357-58 (“Mark Zuckerberg, too, 
qualifies for protection [under § 230] because he is a ‘provider’ of Facebook’s interactive 
computer service and Klayman’s complaint seeks to hold him accountable for his role in making 
that service available.”). 
Second, the AG’s charges against Defendants are based on third-party ads on the website, 
i.e., content provided by other information content providers.  The AG nowhere alleges that 
Defendants authored, created, or participated in posting the ads of the nine individuals.  To the 
contrary, the Complaint and declaration admit the opposite.  See, e.g., Complaint at 2 (alleging 
that “users of Backpage.com … post[ed] escort advertisements”); Fitchner Decl. at 2-3 
(“BACKPAGE is similar to Craigslist.org in that it is an on-line general classified advertising site” 
allowing “user[s] to post advertisements for ‘escorts’” for certain fees); id. at 7-10 (noting that 
users identified as A.H. , E.S., A.C. S.C. L.B. E.V. K.A. and L.F. stated that they posted ads on 
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Backpage.com).  See Delfino, 145 Cal. App. 4th at 807-08 (Section 230 provided immunity to 
defendant where “the complaint consistently and repeatedly attributes authorship of the offensive 
messages to [a third party]”).19 
Finally, the charges target Backpage.com for publishing information online and alleged 
harms “caused by content provided by … third part[ies].”  Gentry, 99 Cal. App. 4th at 830; see 
also id. at 832 (Section 230 forbids putting a website “in the shoes” of individuals who misused 
the site for unlawful purposes).  Indeed, the AG admits Backpage.com takes measures to screen 
and block inappropriate ads, see Complaint at 2 (alleging Mr. Ferrer “developed and oversaw a 
process to screen escort ads”); Fitchner Decl. at 4 (acknowledging screening process), and the only 
facts alleged concerning the website’s screening and removal of ads are that they were effective, 
see Fitchner Decl. at 6-7 (stating that he was unable to post ads with inappropriate terms, 
Mr. Ferrer removed ads as requested, and the website thereafter blocked reposting of the same 
ads).  These are precisely the efforts the CDA was designed to protect, and the AG’s charges 
based on Agent Fichtner’s opinions about the “obvious nature” of escort ads or the efficacy of 
Backpage.com’s screening processes are precisely what the CDA prohibits.  As Cooper held, 
“Backpage.com is the quintessential publisher contemplated by the CDA: it hosts and maintains 
an ongoing forum for user-generated postings—some paid, others free—that it shares with the 
public at large.”  939 F. Supp. 2d at 823.  See also Doe II v. Myspace Inc., 175 Cal. App. at 573 
                                                 
19 Because there is no dispute here that third-party users created and posted the ads that are the 
premise of the AG’s charges, People v. Bollaert, 248 Cal. App. 699 (2016), is inapplicable.  
There, the Court of Appeal held that a website was not immune under Section 230 because it 
forced users to provide information that was itself unlawful and violated privacy rights of 
individuals whose compromising photos were posted by other users (i.e., the website required 
users to provide names, locations and Facebook addresses of the persons photographed).  Id. at 
833-34.  In so doing, the court followed the narrow exception to Section 230 immunity discussed 
in Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157.  See Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1198 
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (Roommates.com “carved out only a narrow exception” that “turned entirely on 
the website’s decision to force subscribers to divulge the protected characteristics and 
discriminatory preferences as a condition of using its services.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 663, 665 (E.D. Tex. 2009) 
(distinguishing Roommates.com because “[t]he Ninth Circuit repeatedly stated … that the 
Roommates.com website required its users to provide certain information as a condition of its use 
….” (emphasis in original)).   
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(barring claims by four minors against social networking site where they met men who sexually 
assaulted them; plaintiffs wanted website “to ensure that sexual predators do not gain access to 
(i.e., communicate with) minors” and “[t]hat type of activity—to restrict or make available certain 
material—is expressly covered by section 230”). 
This case does not present a close question.  The AG’s abuse of prosecutorial powers is 
obvious because she has admitted Section 230 preempts state laws and precludes a state criminal 
prosecution of Backpage.com.  With other state attorneys general, in 2013 she urged Congress to 
amend Section 230 because the law “prevents State and local law enforcement agencies from 
prosecuting” Backpage.com, noting the McKenna decision, which “held that the CDA preempts 
state criminal law.”  MJN Ex. F.  The AG knows full well that Section 230 precludes the charges 
alleged in the Complaint.  Yet, she has brought them anyway, in a blatant misuse of prosecutorial 
authority.  This is particularly egregious in the context of threatening a publisher with criminal 
penalties—coupled with arrest and incarceration to enforce the threats.   
D. The Complaint Does Not State Facts that Constitute Public Offenses under the 
Criminal Statutes Charged. 
Even setting aside that the AG’s prosecution is legally barred under the First Amendment 
and Section 230 of the CDA, the Court should grant the demurrer because the Complaint fails to 
allege any public offense.  Indeed, the AG has failed to allege essentially all of the elements of the 
charges or any facts to support any claim. 
As noted, the AG’s theory is that the state can prosecute a website (and individuals 
associated with the website in some way, no matter how attenuated) based on allegations that 
users posted content allegedly relating to unlawful conduct, regardless of whether the defendants 
knew of or participated in the unlawful activity.  Every court that has considered this theory has 
rejected it.   
For example, the court in M.A. ex rel. P.K. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. 
Supp. 2d 1041 (E.D. Mo. 2011), rejected arguments that Backpage.com could be held liable “as an 
aider and abettor of minor sex trafficking.”  Id. at 1053-54 (under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2255).  Noting 
that such a charge requires the government to prove that a defendant participated in a specific 
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unlawful venture and acted to make the venture succeed, the court held that accusations attacking 
the website fell well short of “the specific intent required for aiding and abetting.”  Id. at 1054.   
Sheriff Dart raised and lost a similar claim in Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961 
(N.D. Ill. 2009).  The court rejected his argument that Craigslist violated criminal prostitution laws 
because it had an “adult services” category, holding this does not “cause” postings except “‘in the 
sense of providing a place where people can post,” and websites “are not culpable for ‘aiding and 
abetting’ their customers who misuse their services to commit unlawful acts.”  Id. at 967, 969 
(“having an adult services category is not unlawful in itself nor does it necessarily call for 
unlawful content”).   
More recently, the court in Doe v. Backpage.com, 104 F. Supp. 3d 149, held that 
accusations attacking the Backpage.com website could not establish “affirmative participation in 
an illegal venture” because having “an escorts section in a classified ad service, whatever its social 
merits, is not illegal” and other features of the website or allegations about its efforts to screen 
improper content could not be the basis for criminal liability.  104 F. Supp. 3d at 157.  See also 
Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that “[e]ven entities that know the 
information’s content do not become liable for the sponsor’s deeds,” and asking rhetorically:  
“Does a newspaper that carries an advertisement for ‘escort services’ or ‘massage parlors’ aid and 
abet the crime of prostitution, if it turns out that some (or many) of the advertisers make money 
from that activity?”).  “A web host cannot be classified as an aider and abettor of criminal 
activities conducted through access to the Internet” any more so than a telephone company aids or 
abets the sale of tapes or narcotics sold by phone or the Postal Service aids and abets such sales 
delivered by mail.  Id.  Backpage.com simply cannot be subject to criminal liability as “an 
intermediary between the advertisers of adult services and visitors to [the] website.”  
Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d at 234.   
Similarly, the U.S. Department of Justice has expressly acknowledged that federal sex 
trafficking laws do not impose criminal liability on websites for publishing third-party content that 
may concern illegal acts.  The DOJ’s National Coordinator for Child Exploitation Prevention and 
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Interdiction was asked in Congressional hearings:  “[W]hat laws apply to Internet providers like 
craigslist that would make them criminally liable for the postings?”  She responded: 
I am not aware of any laws that would make them liable [for third-party postings], 
unless there was evidence that craigslist was a participant ... conspiring with those 
who were misusing their site, that is, knowingly conspiring to violate the laws. . .. 
[T]he standard for prosecution would be knowing or willful. ... I am not aware of 
anything that shows us that craigslist might be criminally liable.  [A]t this point 
we have the proper tools.  We have what we need to prosecute the guilty, that is, 
the people who are using the Internet....  And I don't think anyone ... here would 
propose closing the Internet.   
Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland 
Security of the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 11lth Cong. 215-16 (2010). 
In fact, when the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washington later launched a 
criminal investigation of Backpage.com, the federal court in that district quashed the grand jury 
subpoenas issued at the government’s behest.  Backpage.com argued that the subpoenas and 
investigation violated the First Amendment, see, e.g., Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 
1087-88 (9th Cir. 1972) (“Were we to hold that the exercise of editorial judgments ... raised an 
inference that the persons involved in the judgments had or may have had criminal intent, we 
would destroy effective First Amendment protection ....”), were unreasonable and oppressive 
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 17, and reflected an improper motive rather than a legitimate investigation.  
The court’s orders remain sealed, but, as noted, the court quashed the government’s subpoenas, 
and the U.S. Attorney's Office then terminated its investigation. 
1. The “Pimping” Allegations Against Mr. Ferrer Are Wholly Deficient. 
The allegations of the Complaint and incorporated declaration regarding all defendants are 
wholly deficient in that they allege nothing more than that they were associated with 
Backpage.com, which published and received $79.60 in payment for ads from nine individuals 
who allegedly were involved in prostitution.  The Complaint and declaration provide no 
allegations of any knowledge, involvement or participation by any of the defendants in any illegal 
conduct of any of the nine individuals.   
First, with regard to the charges against Mr. Ferrer for pimping, the Complaint and 
declaration allege only that he is the CEO of Backpage.com, Fitchner Decl. at 2; has been the sole 
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named partner of Backpage.com’s parent company since late 2014, id. at 3; “runs the day-to-day 
operations” of Backpage.com, id. at 4; was “copied on” Backpage.com’s responses to law 
enforcement subpoenas, id.; had been the recipient of communications from the National Center 
for Missing and Exploited Children (without mentioning whether this relates to Backpage.com’s 
regular reporting to NCMEC of suspect ads), id. at 3-4; has “publicly acknowledged” that 
“prostitution occurs on BACKPAGE” while acting to “mitigate[ ] criminal activity through a 
screening process,” id.; cooperated and promptly acted to remove an ad that Agent Fitchner had 
posted when he told Mr. Ferrer that he was “law enforcement” and had “identified a prostitution 
ad,” id. at 6; and emailed a payment processor about whether banks might be concerned about 
“sexy email address names” of customers, id. at 12.   
Otherwise, Agent Fitchner describes information he and other DOJ personnel learned in 
interviews of the nine individuals about their activities, id. at 7-11; see also Complaint at 4-9; 
mentions unrelated “undercover operations” conducted by DOJ (i.e., posting sting ads on the 
website), id. at 4, and offers his opinion that “it [is] plain to any individual … that BACKPAGE’s 
‘Escort’ ads are for prostitution,” id.  
None of this shows or even alleges that Mr. Ferrer (or anyone at Backpage.com, for that 
matter) had any connection to any ads of the nine individuals that are the premise for the criminal 
charges.  The AG alleges no facts that Mr. Ferrer ever saw any advertisements of these 
individuals, much less that he knew any of them were acting as prostitutes, which is the central 
element of Penal Code § 266h (liability applicable only to “any person who, knowing another 
person is a prostitute ….”); see also CALCRIM 1150.  Similarly, there is no allegation whatsoever 
that Mr. Ferrer “derive[d] support or maintenance … from the earnings or proceeds of [these] 
persons’ prostitution,” or that he knowingly “solicit[ed] or receiv[ed] compensation for soliciting 
[prostitution services] for [these] person[s].”  Penal Code § 266h.20  Nor does the AG assert any 
                                                 
20 Penal Codes § 266h(a) provides: 
[A]ny person who, knowing another person is a prostitute, lives or derives support 
or maintenance in whole or in part from the earnings or proceeds of the person’s 
prostitution, or from money loaned or advanced to or charged against that person 
by any keeper or manager or inmate of a house or other place where prostitution 
is practiced or allowed, or who solicits or receives compensation for soliciting for 
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
 
 25 
DEMURRER TO CRIMINAL COMPLAINT, Case No. 16FE019224 
D
A
V
IS
 W
R
IG
H
T 
TR
EM
A
IN
E 
LL
P 
allegations that Mr. Ferrer had any knowledge that the ads posted by the nine individuals were for 
unlawful conduct or knew that the individuals who are the subject of Counts Two-Six were 
minors, as is constitutionally required.   
California law does not allow a charge or conviction under Penal Code § 266h without 
proof that the defendant had knowledge that another person (from whom he obtained support) was 
acting as a prostitute.  See Wooten v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. App. 4th 422, 437 (2001) (reversing 
trial court’s denial of motion to set aside information alleging pimping charges against strip club 
owners where there was no showing they had knowledge that a dancer had offered to perform a 
sex act; “pimping requires that a defendant know that another person is a prostitute”).  So too, the 
government’s obligation is to allege and prove the defendant’s knowledge of specific acts of 
prostitution; allegations of “general knowledge” are not enough.  Id. at 438 (rejecting argument 
that strip club owners could be convicted of pimping or pandering based on “general awareness of 
sex acts occurring at the club”). 21 
2. The Conspiracy Charges Against Defendants Are Likewise Deficient. 
The Complaint’s charge of conspiracy to commit pimping against all three defendants, 
Complaint at 1-4 (Count One), is also completely deficient under California law.   
To convict on a charge of conspiracy, the government must prove that the defendant and 
another person entered into an agreement with the specific intent to commit an offense, as well as 
the specific intent to commit the elements of that offense, together with proof of the commission 
of an overt act “by one or more of the parties to such agreement” in furtherance of the conspiracy.  
People v. Morante, 20 Cal. 4th 403, 416 (1999) (quoting Penal Code § 184).  The Complaint 
alleges none of these elements, and the declaration offers no facts to support any conspiracy 
charge.   
                                                                                                                                                                
the person, is guilty of pimping, a felony, and shall be punishable by 
imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or six years. 
21 Count Five alleges attempted pimping in violation of Penal Code §§ 266h and 664.  Complaint 
at 6.  This charge would require proof that the defendant had the specific intent to engage in 
pimping.  People v. Toledo, 26 Cal. 4th 221, 229-30 (2001). 
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
 
 26 
DEMURRER TO CRIMINAL COMPLAINT, Case No. 16FE019224 
D
A
V
IS
 W
R
IG
H
T 
TR
EM
A
IN
E 
LL
P 
Again, the Complaint and declaration do not purport to allege that the defendants knew 
about any of the supposedly improper advertisements before they appeared on Backpage.com, or 
that the ads concerned any illegal activity, or that defendants knew of and agreed to commit any 
crime.  The allegations concerning Mr. Ferrer (discussed above) do not assert or suggest he 
entered into any agreement with anyone with the intent to commit a crime. 
The allegations concerning Messrs. Lacey and Larkin are no better.  The Complaint and 
declaration assert that these gentlemen founded Backpage.com in 2004 and remained controlling 
shareholders until 2012, when Backpage.com separated from its former parent company, Fitchner 
Decl. at 2; owned and participated in operating Backpage.com until late 2014, Complaint at 2, 
Fitchner Decl. at 3;22 received communications from NCMEC, as did Mr. Ferrer, Fitchner Decl. at 
3-4; received “regular updates, correspondence, and meeting notices” from Mr. Ferrer, id. at 4; 
received “bonuses” in September 2014 (before they sold their interests in Backpage.com), id. at 4; 
and revenues from Backpage.com were once used to pay them salaries and bonuses, id. at 6.   
Nothing in these meager alleged facts suggests participation in a criminal conspiracy.  
There is no alleged agreement to commit a crime, no suggestion that Mr. Lacey, Mr. Larkin or Mr. 
Ferrer intended to commit the crime of pimping, no contention that any man knew that any of the 
subject ads concerned prostitution or any illegal activity, and not even a hint that they knew 
anything about or had anything to do with the ads.  Instead, the AG charges Messrs. Lacey and 
Larkin with a criminal conspiracy on the sole basis that they once owned Backpage.com.  Such 
allegations are a far cry from meeting the statutory definition of conspiracy.  See Morante, 20 Cal. 
4th at 416; cf. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 659 (“[Under] the ordinary understanding of 
culpable assistance to a wrongdoer,” the defendant must have “a desire to promote the wrongful 
venture’s success . ... That web hosting services … may be used to carry out illegal activities does 
not justify condemning their provision whenever a given customer turns out to be crooked.”). 
                                                 
22 The status of the defendants as corporate officers and shareholders is irrelevant.  “It is well 
settled that ‘[a]n officer of a corporation is not criminally answerable for any act of a corporation 
in which he [or she] is not personally a participant.’”  Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court, 24 
Cal. App. 4th 446, 457 (1994) (alterations by Sea Horse Ranch court) (quoting Otis v. Superior 
Court, 148 Cal. 129, 131 (1905). 
1 IV. CONCLUSION 
2 This prosecution is patently improper, given the obvious disconnect between the charges in 
3 the Complaint and the factual allegations asserted by the AG. The state cannot marshal any facts 
4 even suggesting that the defendants committed any crime. The AG's prosecution tramples First 
5 Amendment rights and is flatly barred by Section 230, as she has admitted. Defendants' demurrer 
6 should be granted without leave to amend, and this proceeding should be swiftly terminated. 
7 DATED: October 19,2016 Respectfully submitted, 
8 DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 
EOPLEOFTHE TATEOF 
CALIFORNIA, 
v. 
1. CARL FERRER 
Plaintiff, 
(DOB:-)(Xref#s:'cYl'<7'oiD ) 
2. MICHAELLACEY 
(DOB: -) (Xref#%'0'f '10 1'3 ) 
3. JAMES LARKIN 
(DOB: -)o(Xref#s'o11ol'1--
Defendants. 
Case No. 
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 
I, the undersigned, say on information and belief, that in the County of Sacramento, State of 
California: 
COUNT ONE 
(Penal Code sections 182/266h, PIMPING CONSPIRACY) 
On or between January I, 2010 and September 26,2016, in the County of Sacramento and 
throughout the state of California, Defendants FERRER, LACEY, and LARKIN did unlawfully 
CRIMfNAL COMPLAfNT 
commit the crime of CONSPIRACY in violation ofseciion 182(a)(l) of the Penal Code in that. 
2 . said Defendants did unlawfully conspire together with each other and with others whose identities 
3 are known and unknown, to commit the crime of pimping, in violation of section 266h of the 
4 Penal Code, a felony; and that pursuant to and for the purposes of carrying out the objectives of 
5 the aforesaid conspiracy, the said Defendants committed the following overt acts, throughout the 
6 alleged time period: 
7 Overt Act 1 
8 On or between January I, 2010 and September 26,2016, Defendants LARKIN and 
9 LACEY owned a website at www.Backpage.com;which provided online classified ad services .. 
10 OvertAct2 
II On or between January I, 2010 and September 26, 2016 Defendants LARKIN, LACEY, 
12 and FERRER operated Backpage.com. 
13 Overt Act 3. 
14 On or between January I, 2010 and May20!5, Defendants LARKIN, LACEY, and 
15 FERRER required users ofBackpage.com to pay to post escort advertisements in the adult 
16 services section, unlike any other section ofthe·website. 
17 Overt Act 4 
18 Defendant FERRER developed and oversaw a process to screen escort ads on 
19 Backpage.com. 
20 Overt Act 5 
21 Defendant FERRER directed the creation of two additional websites, Evi!Empire.com and 
22 BigCity.com. 
23 Overt Act 6 
·24 · Defendant FERRER used content from escort advertisements on Backpage:com to create··· 
25 advertisements on Evi!Empire.com and BigCity.com. 
26 Overt Act 7 
27 On or about late 2013, Defendant FERRER arranged for credit card transactions to be 
28 processed by Jetpay because financial institutions were blocking transactions with Backpage.com. 
2 
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Overt Act 8 
2 Between October 2014 and May 2015, Backpage accepted at least $2,000,000.00 per month 
3 in payments from people posting adult section advertisements in California. 
4 Overt Act 9 
5 On or about September 10,2014, Backpage.com received a credit card payment in the 
6 amount of $20.60 for posting an escort advertisement in Sacramento County featuring minor A. C. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Overt Act 10 
On or about August 19,2014, Backpage.com received a credit card payment in the amount 
. of $12.00 for posting an escort advertisement in Los Angeles County featuring minor E.V. · 
II Overt Act 11 
12 On or about February 8, 2015, Backpage.com received a credit card payment in the amount 
13 of $1 0.00 for posting an escort advertisement in Santa Clara County featuring minor L.F. 
14 
15 
Overt Act12 
On or about July 25, 2015, Backpage.com posted an escort advertisement in Sacramento 
16 
County featuring minor E.S. 
17 
18 Overt Act 13 
19 On or about February I, 2015, Backpage.com received a payment in .the amount of$10.00 
20 for posting an escort advertisement in Los Angeles County featuring minor Z.G. 
21 
22 
23 
-24-
Overt Act 14 
On or about October 7, 2012, Backpage.com received a credit card payment in the amount 
of $7.00 for posting an escort advertisement in Sacramento County featuring A.H. 
26 On or aboutJuly 30, 2014, Backpage.com received a payment in the amount of$5.00 for 
27 posting an escort advertisement in Sacramento County featuring S.C. 
28 
3 
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Overt Act 16 
2 · On or about August 19,2014, Backpage.com received a credit card payment in the amount 
3 of$12.00 for posting an escort advertisement in Los Angeles County featuring L.B: 
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Overt Act 17 
On or about April4, 2015, Backpage.com received a credit card payment in the amount of 
$3.00 for posting an escort advertisement in Sacramento County featuring K.A. 
COUNT TWO 
(Penal Code section 266h(b)(2), PIMPING A MINOR UNDER 16 YEARS OF AGE) 
For a further and separate cause of action, being a different offense from, but connected in 
its commission with, ·the charge set forth above, on or about and between September I, 2014 
through December 31, 2014, in the County of Sacramento, Defendant FE~R did unlawfully 
commit the crime of pimping of a minor, in violation of Penal Code section 266h(b), in that said 
Defendant, knowing A. C. a minor under 16 years of age, to engage in prostitution, did live and 
derive support and maintenance in whole or in part from the earnings and proceeds of said 
prostitution or from money loaned to or advanced to and charged against said prostitute by a 
keeper manager and inmate of a house and other place where prostitution was practiced or 
allowed or did unlawfully, knowing A.C., a minor under 16 years of age, io engage in 
prostitution, solicit and receive compensation for soliciting for said prostitute. 
NOTICE: Conviction of this offense will require you to register pursuant to Penal Code 
section 290. Willful failure to register is a crime. 
NOTICE: Pursuant to Penal Code sections 11166 and 11168, a Suspected Child Abuse 
Report (SCAR) may have been generated in this case. Penal Code sections 11167 and 11167.5 
limit access to a SCAR. A court-issued protective order is necessary to obtain a copy of the 
·report.--
COUNT THREE 
(Penal Code section 266h(b)(2), PIMPING A MINOR UNDER 16 YEARS OF AGE) 
For a further and separate cause of action, being a different offense from, but connected in 
its commission with, the charge set forth above, on or about and between August I, 2014 through 
4 
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
i 
I 22 
I 
I 
23 
24 
I 25 
I 
' 26 
27 
28 
January I, 2015, in the County of Los Angeles, Defendant FERRER did unlawfully commit the 
· crime of pimping, in violation of Penal Code section 266h(a), in that said Defendant, knowing 
E.V., to be a prostitute, did live and derive support and maintenance in whole or in part from the 
earnings and proceeds of said prostitution or from money loaned to or advanced to and charged 
against said prostitute by a keeper manager and irimate of a house and other place where 
prostitution was practiced or allowed, or did unlawfully, knowing E.V., to be a prostitute, solicit 
and receive compensation for soliciting for said prostitute. · 
NOTICE: Conviction of this offense will require you to register pursuant to Penal Code 
section 290. Willful failure to register is a crime. 
NOTICE: Pursuant to Penal Code sections 11166 and 11168, a Suspected Child Abuse 
Reporr(SCAR) may have been generated in this case. Penal Code sections 11167 and 11167.5 
limit access to a SCAR. A court-issued protective order is necessary to obtain a copy of the 
report. 
COUNT FOUR 
(Penal Code section 266h(b)(2), PIMPING A MINOR UNDER 16 YEARS OF AGE) 
For a further and separate cause of action, being a different offense from, but connected in 
its commission with, the charge set forth above, on or about and between JanuarY I, 2015 through 
February 28,2015, in the County of Santa Clara, Defendant FERRER did unlawfully commit the 
crime of pimping of a minor, in violation of Penal Code section 266h(b ), in that said Defendant, 
knowing L.F., a minor under 16 years, to engage in prostitution, did five and derive support and 
maintenance in whole or in part from the earnings and proceeds of s.aid prostitution or from 
money1oaned to or advanced to and charged against said prostitute by a keeper manager' and 
inmate of a house and other place where prostitution was practiced or allowed, or did unlawfully, 
knowing L.F., a minor under 16 years of age, to engage in prostitution, solicit and receive 
c~oiiiji'eiisaiioii for so!icitTiijffor ·said prosihiiie:·· . - ...... .,. - - -- --·- .......... ···-· ··-- ....... - . 
NOTICE: Conviction of this offense will require you to register pursuant to Penal Code 
section 290. Willful failure to register is a crime. 
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NOTICE: Pursuant to Penal Code sections 11166 and 11168, a Suspected Child Abuse 
Report (SCAR) may have been generated in this case. Penal Code sections 11167 and 11167.5 
limit access to a SCAR. A court-issued protective order is necessary to obtain a copy of the 
report. 
COUNT FIVE 
(Penal Code sections·266h(b)(2)/664), ATTEMPTED PIMPING OF A MINOR UNDER 16) 
For a further and separate cause of action, being a different offense from, but connected in 
its commission with, the charge set forth above, on or about and between July 1, 2015 through 
August 31, 2015, in the County of Sacramento, Defendant FERRER did unlawfully commit the 
crime of attempted pimping of a·minor, in violation of Penal Code sections 266h(a)/664, in that 
said Defendant, knowing E.S., a minor under 16 years of age, to engage in prostitution, did live 
and derive support and maintenance in whole or in part from the earnings and proceeds of said 
prostitution or from money loaned to or advanced to and charged against said prostitute by a 
keeper manager and inmate of a house and other place where prostitution was practiced or 
allowed, or did unlawfully, knowing E.S., a minor under 16 years of age, to engage in 
prostitution, solicit and receive compensation for soliciting for said prostitute. 
NOTICE: Conviction of this offense will require you to register pursuant to Penal Code 
section 290. Willful failure to register is a crime. 
NOTICE: Pursuant to Penal Code sections 11166 and 11168, a Suspected Child Abuse 
Report (SCAR) may have been generated in this case. Penal Code sections 11167 and 11167.5 
limit access to a SCAR. A court-issued protective order is necessary to obtain a copy of the 
report. 
COUNT SIX 
(Penal Code section 266h(b)(2), PIMPING A MINOR) 
.. ·--. ·-··-.-
For a further and separate cause of action, being a different offense from, but connected in 
its commission with, the charge set forth above, on or about and between June 1, 2015 through 
September 30,2015, in the County of Los Angeles, Defendant FERRER did unlawfully commit 
the crime of pimping of a minor, in violation of Penal Code section 266h(b), in that said 
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Defendant, knowing Z.G., a minor, to engage in prostitution, did live and derive support and 
maintenance in whole or in part from the earnings and proceeds of said prostitution or from 
money loaned to or advanced to and charged agai.nst said prostitute by a keeper manager and 
inmate of a house and other place where prostitUtion was practiced or allowed, or did unlawfully, 
knowing Z.G., a minor, to engage in prostitution, solicit and receive compensation for soliciting 
for said prostitute. 
NOTICE: Conviction of this offense will require you to register pursuant to Penal Code 
section 290. Willful failure to register is a crime. 
NOTICE: Pursuant to Penal Code sections 11166 and 11168, a Suspected Child Abuse 
Report (SCAR) may have been generated in this case. Penal Code sections 11167 and 11167.5 
limit access to a SCAR. A court-issued protective order is necessary to obtain a copy of the 
report. 
COUNT SEVEN 
(Penal Code section 266h(a),PIMPING) 
For a further and separate cause of action, being a different offense from, but connected in 
its commission with, the charge set forth above, on or about and between April28, 2014 through 
March 6, 2015, in the County of Sacramento, Defendant FERRER did unlawfully commit the 
crime of pimping; in violation of Penal Cocje section 266h(a), in that said Defendant, knowing 
A.H., to be a prostitute, did liv~ and derive support and maintenance in whole or in part from the 
earnings and proceeds of said prostitution or from money loaned to or advanced t() and charged 
against said prostitute by a keeper manager and inmate of a house and other place where 
prostitution was practiced or allowed, or did unlawfully, knowing A. H., to be a prostitute, solicit 
and receive compensation for soliciting for said prostitute. 
: .... COUNTEIGHT----
(Penal Code section 266h(a), PIMPING) 
For a further and separate cause of action, being a different offense from, but connected in 
its commission with, the charge set forth above, on or about and between July I, 2014 through 
August 31,2015, in the County of Sacramento, Defendant FERRER did unlawfully commit the 
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crime of pimping, in violation of Penal Code section 266h(a), in that said Defendant, knowing 
S.C., to be a prostitute, did live and derive support and maintenance in whole or in part from the 
earnings and proceeds of said prostitUtion or from money loaned to or advanced to and charged 
against said prostitute by a keeper manager and inmate of a house and other place where 
prostitution was practiced or allowed, or did unlawfully, knowing S.C., to be a prostitute, solicit 
and receive compensation for soliciting for said prostitute. 
COUNT NINE 
(Penal Code section 266h(a)) 
For a further and separate cause of action, being a different offense from, but connected in 
its commission With, the charge set forth above, on or about and between August I, 2014 and 
August 31, 2014, in the County of Los Angeles, Defendant FERRER did unlawfully commit the 
crime of pimping, in violation of Penal Code section 266h(a), in that said Defendant, knowing 
L.B. to be a prostitute, did live and derive support and maintenance in whole or in part from the 
earnings and proceeds of said prostitution or from money loaned to or advanced to and charged 
against said prostitute by a keeper manager and inmate of a house and other place where 
prostitution was practiced or allowed, or did unlawfully, knowing L.B. to be a prostitute, solicit 
and receive compensation for soliciting for said prostitute. 
. COUNT TEN 
(Penal Code section 266h(a)) 
For a further and separate cause of action, being a different offense from, but connected in 
its commission with, the charge set forth above, on or about and between January 1, 2016 to June 
1, 2016 in the County of Sacramento, Defendant FERRER did unlawfully commit the crime of 
pimping, in violation of Penal Code section 266h(a), in that said Defendant, knowing K.A. to be a 
prostitute;_·did live-and-derive support-and maintenance-in whole orin·part·from the earnings and· 
proceeds of said prostitution or from money loaned to or-advanced to and charged against said 
prostitute by a keeper manager and inmate of a house and other place where prostitution was 
practiced or allowed, or did unlawfully, knowing K.A. to be a prostitute, solicit and receive 
compensation for soliciting for said prostitute. 
8 
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1 BOTICE: Penal Code section 1203.065(a) prohibits a grant of probation for offenses 
2 charged in counts 2-10). 
3 Pursuant to Penal Code section 1054.5(b), the People hereby informally request that 
4 defense counsel provide the People with discovery as required by Penal Code section 1054.3. 
5 DECLARATION 
6 Filed herewith and incorporated by reference is a declaration in support of arrest warrant. I 
7 declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to Penal Code section 806, that the forgoing is true and 
8 correct. 
9 
10 Dated: September 26, 2016 
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Respectfully Submitted, 
KAMALA D. HARRIS 
Attorney General of California 
MAGGYKRELL 
Supervising Deputy Attorney General 
Attorneys for People 
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 
EXHIBITB 
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL FERRER, MICHAEL LACEY, and JAMES LARKIN, 
Defendants. 
I, BRIAN FICHTNER, declare: 
DECLARATION IN 
SUPPORT OF ARREST 
WARRANT AND 
WARRANT 
I ani a Special Agent employed by the California Department of Justice (DOJ), 
and that I allege and state the following: 
This Affidavit in support of arrest pertains to an ongoing investigation into CARL 
FERRER ("FERRER"), MICHAEL LACEY ("LACEY"), and JAMES LARKIN 
. ("LARKIN"), collectively referred to as 'Defendants," and the online advertising site 
known as www.backpage.com ("BACKP AGE"). 
Page 1 of14 
Your affiant, a California Peace Officer per California Penal Code Section 830.1, 
asserts that there is probable cause to believe that beiween January 1, 2010 and 
September 28, 2016, FERRER, LACEY, and LARKIN received earnings from 
prostitution through the website they created and operated at www.backpage.com. For at 
least the last five years, Defendants have known that their website is the United States 
hub for the illegal sex trade and that many of the people who advertised for commercial 
sex on BACKP AGE are victims of sex trafficking, including children. This affidavit and 
accompanying complaint seek to arrest and charge Defendants FERRER, LACEY, and 
LARKIN with conspiracy to commit pimping (Penal Code §§ 182/266h) for their 
respective roles and stakes in operating BACKP AGE, and FERRER for pimping (Penal 
Code §'266h) minor victims A.C., E.V., L.F., B.S., Z.G., and adult victims A.H., S.C., 
L.B., and K.A. These victims represent a small fraction of the thousands of California-
based victims exploited in ads reviewed in this investigation. 
The relevant identifying information for the victims is contained in "Confidential 
Attachment" and is herein incorporated. Declarant requests that "Confidential 
Attachment" be ordered sealed pursuant to California Rule of Court Rule 243.1(d) in 
order to protect the confidential personal information of the above subject. (See Pen. 
Code, §§ 293.5 and 964.) 
. BACKPAGE'S Operation 
In 2004, BACKPAGE was founded by LARKIN and LACEY, and FERRER 
managed the site's operation. In 2012, BACKPAGE separated from its parent company 
and LACEY and LARKIN remained controlling shareholders of BACKP AGE while 
FERRER became Chief Executive Officer (CEO). 
BACKP AGE is similar to Craigslist.org in that it is an on-line general classified 
advertising site. The adult services section on BACKP AGE contains ads for prostitution, 
body rubs, massages, escort, and other sexual services for.sale. Nearly naked persons in 
provocative positions are pictured in nearly every adult services advertisement on 
BACKP AGE, and the site charged a fee to the user to post advertisements for '.'escorts" 
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and other similar "services." This "fee to post" or payment system was restructnred in 
July 2015 once credit card companies ceased doing business with BACKP AGE. 
When the largest classified service, Craigslist.org, shut down its "Adult Services" 
category in 2012, "Adult" ads migrated to BACKP AGE, and BACKP AGE capitalized on 
this increased traffic by raising its fees. BACKP AGE also expanded operations, creating 
sites in hundreds of cities throughout the world, including over 30 cities in California. 
In late 2014, FERRER bought BACKP AGE through two of his .Delaware 
companies- CF Holdings and CF Acquisitions- and created BACKP AGE's new parent 
company, the Netherlands-based UGC Tech Group C.V. ("UGC"). FERRER is the only 
named partner ofUGC and remained the CEO ofBACKPAGE. FERRER publicly 
described the sale as part ofBACKP AGE's international expansion. 
Additionally, FERRER devised a way to promote BACKP AGE by creating other 
prostitution-related sites. BACKP AGE owns and operates Evi!Empire.com and 
Bigcity.com using content it developed from BACKP AGE users. According to internaiiy 
records obtained via search warrant, this practice increased BACKPAGE's share of the 
online sex advertising market. 
As im example, Evilempire.com's homepage purports to be an "escort phone 
number directory." The site presents a series of photos, mostly featuring provocatively 
dressed females, with phone numbers listed. These photos are )lyperlinked to posts 
containing common indicators of prostitution, such as donations associated with time 
,periods, and each post includes a link to the associated BACKPAGE ad. The linked 
BACKPAGE ads include essentially identical information to the Evilempire.com posts, 
from the photos to the contact information. Evilempire.com offers no apparent way for 
users to submit content, indicating that all of the content was derived from BACKP AGE 
(in other words, a BACKPAGE escort directory). Evilempire.com functions as an 
additional platform for BACKP AGE Escort ads. 
BACKPAGE acknowledges that pimps routinely pay BACKPAGE for ads 
trafficking children for sex. I have reviewed numerous communications wherein the 
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), among others, inform 
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LACEY, LARKIN, and FERRER of the high number of children exploited on 
BACKPAGE. In reviewing BACKPAGE's email I have also observed numerous law 
enforcement subpoenas and search warrants served on BACKP AGE for sex trafficking 
investigations and BACKPAGE's responses. These email responses include the 
requested copies of BACKP AGE's prostitution advertisement. FERRER was copied on 
these responses. 
FERRER and other BACKPAGE representatives have also publicly 
acknowledged that ongoing prostitution occurs on BACKPAGE but claim to have 
mitigated criminal activity through a screening process. However, the obvious nature of 
the "Escort" ads on BACKPAGE makes it plain to any individual doing any form of 
screening that BACKP AGE's "Escort" ads are for prostitution. DOJ conducted 
undercover operations both posting "Escort" ads and arranging meetings with people 
. advertised in the "Escort" section. Commercial sex was the only purpose of both buyers 
and sellers. 
While FERRER currently runs the day-to-day operations for BACKPAGE, he and 
other high level personnel in BACKP AGE's structure report regularly. to LARKIN and 
LACEY. 
I reviewed emails and BACKP AGE financial records obtained via search warrant 
showing that LACEY and LARKIN regularly receive "bonuses" from BACKPAGE's 
bank accounts. For instance, in September 2014, LACEY and LARKIN each received a 
$10 million bonus. Emails also show regular updates, correspondence, and meeting 
notices between all three Defendants. 
CAL DOJ Investigation 
In 2013, the California Department of Justice (DOJ) began investigating 
BACKP AGE. This investigation was sparked by reports from law enforcement agencies, 
the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), and news stories 
about children who were repeatedly exploited for commercial sex on BACKPAGE: . 
BACKP AGE has described itself as the second largest online classified advertising 
service in the country. I have learned that the majority of BACKPAGE's customers use 
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the site's fee-based "Adult" section to post "Escort" ads that openly offer sexual, lewd 
acts for money and have involved individuals under 18 years of age. 
Since 2012, the NCMEC has worked on more than 400 cases involving children 
sold for commercial sex on BACKPAGE. During this same time period, NCMEC has 
reported 2,900 instances to California law enforcement where suspected child sex 
trafficking occurred via BACKP AGE. 
In May 2014, DOJ agents conducted an undercover sting operation targeting 
individuals being advertised in the Adult Escort section of BACKP AGE. The operation 
. involved an undercover agent responding to Escort advertisements listed on BACKP AGE 
by calling the phone number listed in the ad. Throughout the duration of the operation, 
undercover agents arranged several "dates" with female "Escorts." Each "date" resulted 
with the "Escort" agreeing to meet the undercover agent in a hotel room. Once in the 
hotel room, and within a few minutes of arriving, each "Escort" began negotiating sex 
acts for money with the undercover agent. Based on this behavior, there was no 
mistaking that the sole purpose of the "Escort" ad posted on BACKP AGE was to offer 
sex for money. Each "Escort" was interviewed, but not arrested. 
In March 2015, I creaied two undercover advertisements on the website 
BACKP AGE. One of the ads was posted in the "Escort" section and offered the service . 
of adult companionship for money, the other ad was for the sale of a sofa and was posted 
in the "buy, sell, trade" section ofBACKPAGE. The minimum fee to post the "Escort" 
ad was $10.00. Posting the sofa was free of charge. BACKPAGE also offers the ability 
to upgrade an ad for an additional fee. I upgraded both ads, allowing the ad to be 
automatically reposted to the top of the page several times during the day. The total cost 
. . 
of the "Escort" ad with the upgrade was $11 L20. The total cost of the sofa ad with the 
same upgrade was $1.22. Both o~ the ads were posted using the same undercover cell 
phone number. DOJ Special Agent (SA) Tera Mackey monitored the undercover cell 
phone. Within minutes of the "Escort" ad going live, SA Mackey began receiving calls 
and texts. SA Mackey told me she received hundreds of inquiries for the "Escort" ad, but 
received only one inquiry for the· sofa. SA Mackey said all the calls and texts related to 
the "Escort" ad were requests for sexual acts in exchange for money. 
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I paid for the undercover ads using a Union Bank credit card. Union Bank 
provided me with documents showing that the money from my credit card account went 
to Borgun H.F., an online payment service in Iceland. IA Robert Smith has reviewed 
internal BACKP AGE emails showing the transfer of monies from Borgun H.F. to 
BACKPAGE bank accounts in the United States. Revenue from BACKPAGE was used 
to pay salaries and bonuses to LACEY, LARKIN, and FERRER. 
After letting the undercover ads run for approximately (ten )10 days, I decided to 
call BACKPAGE and ask them to remove it. My goal was to learn the process of 
removing an "Escort" ad from BACKP AGE that law enforcement identifies as an ad for 
prostitution. My first call was to Liz McDougal, BACKP AGE legal counsel, but I 
received her voicemail. My next call was to FERRER. When FERRER answered the 
phone. I identified myself as law enforcement. I told him that I had identified a 
. prostitution ad in the "Escort" section ofBACKP AGE (I did not tell FERRER that I . 
posted the ad) and that I was seeking a way to remove the ad. FERRER initially directed 
me to report the ad by email to abuse@BACKP AGE, but then he asked .for the name of 
the ad. I provided him with the Post ID number for the ad. It was apparent that FERRER 
was looking up the "Escort" ad on his computer because I could hear him typing as I 
provided him with the Post ID number. He explained that if I report the ad to 
abuse@BACKPAGE, I should include my phone number in order to confirm that I was 
law enforcement. He mentioned that they have been "spoofed" by individuals claiming 
to be law enforcement when they were not. 
FERRER told me he located a second ad from the same "user," but it was for a 
"sofa" and did not appear to be illegal. FERRER said he would personally report the ad 
and "lock it out." He said it would be removed by the end of the day. A short time later, I 
searched the website to try and locate the "Escort" ad and the sofa ad, but both ads had 
been removed. I tried to repast the "Escort" ad, but Backapge.com did not allow it to go 
through. 
In May 2015, I created another BACKPAGE "Escort" ad with the goal of trying 
to post an ad containing sexual verbiage indicative of a prostitution ad. I used the words 
"cum" and "quickie" in the ad, but when I tried to post it, I received a message that told 
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me those words were "forbidden in this category." I had to change the words to "come" 
and "quick session" in order for the ad to be accepted. 
BACKP AGE may have restricted the use of the sexual verbiage in my undercover 
ad, but when I conducted a random search of the BACKP AGE escort section, I viewed 
numerous "Escort" ads that contained photos and videos that depicted full nudity. Many 
of these nude ads were simulating and/or performing sexual acts. BACKP AGE states 
they moderate their ads and implement a policy against posting obscene or lewd imd 
lascivious graphics and photographs, however, my personal observations have indicated 
otherwise. 
BACKPAGE Victims 
In October 2015, I interviewed A.H, 27-year-old woman, who was identified as 
posting advertisements for commercial sex in the escort section of BACKP AGE. A.H. 
was one of the individuals contacted and detained during the DOJ sting operation. A.H. 
admitted to posting the advertisements in the escort section of BACKP AGE for the 
purpose of offering sex for money. A.H. told me that she began posting escort 
advertisements on BACKP AGE after Craigslist.org shut down their escort section and 
MyRedbook.com, a prostitution website, was shut down by the federal government. A.H. 
told me she received numerous calls from her ads and each time she met the person it 
ended with her providing sex for money. A.H. told me she used the money she made 
directly· from prostitution to pay for the posting fee of her BACKPAGE advertisements. 
A search for A.H. 's ads revealed continuous postings for a roughly two-year period, 
including after the DOJ operation. These ads were posted in California cities, including 
Sacramento, Los Angeles, Monterey, and Modesto. 
On October 13, 2015, I interviewed E.S., a 15-year-old female, who has been 
identified as a victim of sex trafficking. She told me she was forced into prostitution at 
the age of 13 years old by her pimp. ·She eventually testified against her pimp, bnt once 
she was introduced to "The Life" of prostitution, she began finding her own way of 
making money. She started with the website·MyRedbook.com until it was shut down, and 
then she immediately began using BACKP AGE. She described BACKP AGE as a 
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website that "profits off of women and men .... whether you are wanting to get out there 
and make some money, or you are being forced to do it." She stated, "I mean really, 
coming from someone my age, there is too much access, like it's too easy for people to 
get on it and post an ad." A search for her ads found postings in California, including 
Sacramento, the East Bay, and Fresno. 
On October 22, 2015, I interviewed A. C., a 16 year old female who has been 
identified as a victim of sex trafficking. A. C. told me she was forced into prostitution 
when she was 12 or 13 years old. A. C. said the first website she used to post prostitution 
ads was Craigslist.org. She then used MyRedbook.com until it was shutdown by law 
enforcement. A.C. said she began using BACKPAGE in late 2013 or early 2014. A.C. 
said she posted her own ads on BACKPAGE and used a prepaid "Green Dot" credit card 
to pay the fees. As soon as she posted her ad, she would begin getting calls. A. C. said the 
purpose of her ads was to make money by finding "dates" and providing sex for money. 
She said she averaged 10-12 "dates" a day. A. C. said t!Je majority ofher "dates" resulted 
in having sex for money, but not all. Sometimes she said she would arrange a date just to 
rob them. A. C. told me she used the money she made from her "dates" to repast her 
prostitution ad on BACKPAGE. I asked A. C. if she knew of any policy restrictions for 
advertising on BACKP AGE. A. C. said she knew there was a restriction about posting 
adulr ads on their website. I asked if she ever encountered a problem posting in the adult 
section on BACKP AGE as a minor. She said, "Well no, because how are they supposed 
to know I'm underage?" A search for her ads found Sacramento postings. 
On January 81 2016, SA Mackey interviewed S.C., a 29-year-old female, who has 
been identified as a victim of sex trafficking. She was posted on BACKP AGE for the . 
purpose of engaging in sex for money. She described BACKPAGE as a known 
·prostitution site .. She said BACKP AGE is an escort service to solicit sexual encounters 
and the majority of the victims using BACKP AGE have a pimp because there is not 
enough time to continually update the advertisement and work at the same time. She said 
all the calls she got from her BACKP AGE ad were for sexual services. She said she paid 
for her advertisements using pre-paid credit cards. She stated she had two children 
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during the time she was being trafficked and never learned how to change a diaper or take 
care of a child because she was continually forced to engage· in commercial sex. 
On April18, 2016, DOJ SA Reye Diaz interviewed Z.G., a 17 year old female 
who has been identified as a victim of sex trafficking. She was advertised multiple times 
on BACKPAGE. Z.G. told SA Diaz that ihe website did not restrict her from posting the 
prostitution ads even though she was a minor. She said all her ads resulted in her 
exchanging sex for money. She said she would use the profits from having sex to pay for 
more advertisement on BACKP AGE. She said she would purchase a "Green Dot Visa" 
from a CVS store and use this card to pay the fee to BACKP AGE that is required to post 
the ad. A search for her ads found postings for California cities, including San Gabriel, 
San Diego, San Jose, and Los Angeles. 
On August 18, 2016, I interviewed L.B., a 23-year-old female, who has been 
identified as a victim of sex trafficking. L.B. told me she began using BACKP AGE in 
2012 after being introduced to the prostitution lifestyle by her.sister who was also 
prostituting. I asked her to describe BACKPAGE and she described it as a "prostitution 
thing .... all prostitutes go. on there to sell their bodies." She told me she posted 
advertisements in the "Escort" section ofBACKPAGE for the sole purpose to solicit calls 
. . 
·from individuals to have sex for money. I asked her if she ever·used BACKPAGE for 
anything other than posting ads in the "Escort" section and she said "no." She said all of 
the individuals she met from her ad ended with her having sex for money. L.B. talked 
about having to pay BACKP AGE to post her advertisements. She said she used the 
money from having sex to pay for posting or reposting her advertisements. L.B. said she 
did not have any other income except for the money she made from prostitution. 
Postings of her ads were found in California cities, including Los Angeles, Long Beach, 
and the Inland Empire. 
L.B. told me she advertised on BACKPAGE with E.V., a 13-year-old female, 
who had been previously reported as a runaway to the NCMEC multiple times. In 2014, 
E.V. was identified as a sex trafficking victim during a prostitution sting operation where 
she encountered an undercover officer who was negotiating sex acts for money. The 
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undercover officer met E.V. through their BACKP AGE ''Escort" ad. L.B. 'sand E.V. 's 
"Escort" ad was posted in Long Beach and Los Angeles, CA. 
On Augnst 11, 2016, SA Tera Mackey and I interviewed K.A., a 21 year old 
female that is believed to be a victim of sex trafficking. K.A. said she was 18 years old 
when she started posting "Escort" ads on BACKP AGE. K.A. said that 80-90% of the 
people she met through her ad ended up paying to have sex with her. K.A. said she made 
up to $1,000.00 a day and would use a portion of that money to repast her ads. K.A. said 
she had a boyfriend who knew she was posting ads onBACKPAGE, but denied that he 
was involved. K.A. told me she has paid for most of her escort ads using Bitcoin. K.A. 
explained that she would buy Amazon gift cards and then sell them on the website 
Paxful.com for Bitcoin. K.A. said she learned about BACKP AGE from friends who also 
posted "Escort" ads. K.A. has only used BACKP AGE to post "Escort" ads. K.A. said 
she knows people can use BACKP AGE to sell other things, but she has never known 
anyone to use BACKPAGE for anything other than the "Escort" section. I asked K.A. if 
BACKP AGE ever prevented or interfered with her posting "Escort" ads on its website 
and she said no. K.A. said she knew that BACKPAGE.did not allow certain words, 
langnage, or nudity in the ads so she avoided those things. Her ads were found posted in 
Sacramento, CA. 
On March 11, 2015, L.F., a 15-year-old female, testified in a California Superior 
Court as a victim of sex trafficking. I reviewed the transcripts of her testimony. L.F. 
testified that she went on-line and met a 32-year-old male adult, identified as Patrick 
SIMMONS, in November 2014 and began "sexting" with him. She said they met in 
person for the first time in Januar)i 2015 and began having a sexual relationship. L.F. 
said their relationship evolved to the point where she began prostituting for SIMMONS 
to make him money. L.F. testified she created an escort advertisement for SIMMONS to 
post on BACKP AGE. L.F. testified that the escort ad was set up for her to meet 
individuals for "dates" that resulted in her having sex for money. L.F. said the money 
she made from these dates went directly to SIMMONS. L.F. testified that SIMMONS 
became physically violent and controlling. She described how SIMMONS would hit her 
and force her to have sex with him. In February 2015, L.F. and SIMMONS were caught 
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during a prostitution sting by the San Jose Police Department after an undercover officer 
called the phone number in L.F. 's escort. ad and arranged a "date." SIMMONS was 
subsequently charged with pimping, pandering, and human trafficking. I have been able 
to identify four ( 4) BACKP AGE escort ads for L.F. that were posted in February 2015 in 
which BACKP AGE charged a total of $35.00 for the posting fees. The ad locations 
include the California city, Fresno and the East Bay area. 
I was able to obtain transaction records through BACKPAGE verifying that each 
of the above victims, with the exception of B.S., made payments to BACKP AGE for their 
advertisements. 
BACKPAGE Finances 
DOJ Investigative Auditors Darrel Early and Robert Smith examined 
BACKP AGE's internal financial records and revenue spreadsheets, which we obtained 
via search warrant. Their examination focused on BACKP AGE revenue that was 
attributable to California-based sales. 
The BACKP AGE revenue report obtained includes California-based revenue 
covering the time period of January 2013 through May 2015, broken down into six 
regions. BACKPAGE internal records break out the percentage of revenue attributable to 
Adult Services. From January 2013 through March 2015,99% ofBACKPAGE's gross 
revenue (worldwide income) was directly attributable io Adult ads. In April 2015, this 
percentage dropped to 97% and in May 2015, it further dropped to 90%. The timing of 
this decrease coincides with the decision of credit card companies like American Express 
to stop processing BACKPAGE payments. 
During this 29-month period, BACKP AGE's gross monthly income from 
California rose $1.5 million/month to $2.5 million/month. During this reporting period 
(Jan 2013- May 2015), BACKPAGE self-reported $51,723,615.23 in revenue derived 
from California. Approximately $50,920,739.36 of this derived from adult entertainment 
advertising (98.43% ). Further examination of BACKP AGE records demonstrated that 
California, during this reporting period (Jan 2013- May 2015), was responsible for 
14.95% ofBACKPAGE's worldwide income. 
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BACKP AGE internal records further break down the revenue that is attributable 
to adult entertainment. Adult ads include the subcategories of: Adult Jobs; Body Rubs; 
Datelines; Domination; Female Escorts; Fetish; Male Escorts; Strippers; and Transsexual 
Escorts. BACKP AGE records state that the worldwide revenue for these subcategories 
. for June 22-28, 2015 was $3,137,646.28. Revenue attributable to California for this week 
was 17% of the total revenue or $545,952.54. Female Escorts generated 72.8% of this 
revenue; Body Rubs 18.8%; and Transsexual Escorts 5.5%. All othei: subcategories were 
less the 1%. 
Until July 2015, BACKPAGE required payment for ads featuring content related 
to commercial sex acts, particularly in the Escort category. These payments could be 
made by credit card. Durfng the same time, BACKPAGE allowed users to post ads for 
free in non-Adult sections of the site, such as furniture sales. 
To avoid scrutiny by banks or other credit card processors BACKP AGE 
· controlled the nature of the customer information provided to the payment processor. In 
a May 2015 email I reviewed, FERRER asked this question of one of his payment 
processing partners: 
"Do you think we should not send·email addresses to processors/banks 
when we do transactions? 
Example of Cltstomer email addresses: 
sexygirl6~l.com 
porn_star--.com 
Naked_goddes~.com 
We could send an account number instead? Do the banks see these email 
addresses when we send the transaction to the processor? We think for 
example Chase might block transactions for their card holders based on 
overtly sexy email address names ... 
In July 2015, major credit cards stopped processing BACKPAGE transactions and 
BACKPAGE began to allow users to post Adult ads for free. Nonetheless, BACKPAGE 
has continued to collect fees for promoted ·or sponsored ads and created complex 
payment processing procedures to avoid detection from financial institutions. 
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Conclusion 
Under California law, it is a felony to either solicit on behalf of a prostitute, or 
derive any income, from the earnings of a prostitute.1 (Penal Code section 266h, 
Pimping.) Section 266h also has a special provision detailing added penalties for the 
pimping of a minor, depending on whether the victim is und~r 16 or between 16 and .18 
years old.2 
BACKPAGE's escort services section essentially operates as an online brothel. 
Transactions consist of a user paying a fee to BACKP AGE. In exchange for the fee, 
BACKPAGE advertises on behalf of and solicits clients for prostitution services. The ads 
unequivocally sell sexual services, featuring extremely provocative pictures and lightly 
veiled or coded sexual terminology. BACKP AGE receives a fee for each ad. 
~RRER derived support from the earnings of victims A. C., E.V., L.F., Z.G., A.H., 
S.C., L.B., and K.A., who were sold for sex through BACKPAGE while FERRER served 
as CEO overseeing every aspect of the company, including law enforcement 
correspondence related to sex trafficking, moderation of ad content, and expansion and 
development. 
Based on tlie aforementioned information, I believe ther~ is probable cause to 
believe that FERRER, LACEY, and LARKIN, committed the following crimes: 
conspiracy in violation of Penal Code section 182, (a)(1), a felony; pimping in violation 
1 
"[D]eriving support with knowledge that the other person is a prostitute is all 
that is required for violating the section in this manner. No specific intent is required." 
(!'eople v. McNulty (1988) 202 Cai.App.3d 624, 630.) 
2 Mistake of age is not a defense to this offense; the age only affects the severity 
of the sentence not the criminality of the conduct.· (People v. Branch (2010) 184. 
Cal.App.4th 516.) 
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of Penal Code section 266h, subdivision (a), a felony; pimping a minor in violation of 
Penal Code section 266h, subdivision (b)(2), a felony; and attempted pimping of a minor 
in violation of Penal Code sections 266h, subdivision (b )(2) and 664, a felony; and that 
an arrest warrant be issued for Defendants for the relevant felony violations charged in the 
accompanying Felony Complaint. 
• Carl FERRER: Texas 
Driver's License:-; SSN: -; Residence on file with Texas 
• James Anthony LARKIN: 
.; Arizona Driver's License-; SSN: --; Residence on 
file with Arizona 
• Michael Gerard lACEY: 
Arizona Driver's License Residence on file 
with ACJIZOlla 
I declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the State of California, that all facls 
contained in this affidavit is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
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EXHIBIT C 



